Bantu Philosophy by Ben Dekker

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BANTU PHILOSOPHY

Introduction

It is the thesis of this paper that Bantu Philosophy has a unique and distinct view of the world which is based on a notion (a pre-logical assumption or a primitive fact) which fulfils more or less the same need in the human search for meaning as does the notion of BEING in Western Philosophy. It is unfortunately not possible to show if this notion has remained relatively constant during the written period of African history; but evidence from relatively unaffected populations, linguistic evidence, anthropological insights, etc. all indicate that it has survived both Arab thinking and the many oppressive systems of colonial acculturation. This thesis will try to show how this basic notion affects Bantu attitudes, thinking and concepts. It is hoped that once this rich seedbed of cultural cross-pollination is recognized by the rest of the world, that some of the advantages accruing from its application will be adopted or adapted by other cultures of the world.

Less than a century ago philosophy was arbitrarily assumed to be the prerogative of Western thinking (i.e. those who had followed the Greek innovation of an ontological basis for the understanding of the universe). All other wisdom, thinking, love of knowledge, science and even religion was dismissed as mysticism or primitive and relegated to the curio section of Western philo-anthropological museums.

More recently the West has started to overcome its ill-based assumptions of superiority and has conceded to the reclassification of Eastern mysticism as philosophy.

This is not a particularly great concession as the East and West have a

fairly long-standing written tradition, a sizeable body of written philosophical works, a number of identifiable individuals to whom these works can be attributed and a fair amount of interchangeability between their notions and concepts. In addition the West has started to realize the roots of its own thinking in pre-logical shamanism. There is also a growing realization that the laws of logic do not extend to the ragged edge of the universe. A growing interest in the ragged edge – formerly dismissed as mysticism – to fill the gaps in Western science, technology and thinking has made the West a little more tolerant of non-Western world views.

Many writers believed that the meeting of Western logic and Eastern mysticism would lead to a creative fusion of the two and a new direction in the overall world view. Either this is happening so slowly as to be barely perceptible, or it did not happen. (My own feeling is that such a process of cultural cross-pollination is very slow and that it is happening on a minutely-perceptible scale.) If it did not happen, or was delayed, this could well have been the result of the contemporaneous and unprecedented expansion of Western science and technology, both based on the strict logic of the scientific method and its assumptions of causality, induction and the fidelity of human observation. The ‘gee-whiz’ discoveries of science and technology preoccupied the mainstreams of thought in the literate world and Eastern ‘mysticism’ was adopted or adapted only by some fringe groups. No serious or sustained attempt was made to correlate or fuse the two.

Bantu philosophy runs the same risk of being ignored. In the past it has been ignored because of the facile assumptions of racism and colonialism which justified slavery and other massive exploitations rather than allow basic human recognition. In the future Bantu Philosophy may be ignored in favour the techno-electronic revolution, space exploration or global war. I hope that the growing realization of the related problems of over-exploitation of natural resources, pollution and over-population (together with the increased interpersonal stresses they embody) may lead to an openness to value systems which use the qualitative and creative relationship between man and man and between man and his environment as their base; rather that the present exploitative relationships. Such a qualitative and creative relationship I believe – and will attempt to show – Bantu Philosophy to engender. It has been applied to the ‘structuring of traditional (and some modern) African societies.

This does not suggest that African societies are ideal prototypes which need only be enlarged to make them applicable to the world at large: such a suggestion would be ludicrous. I merely wish to contend that the basis of African social organizations, technology, art, relationship to environment, etc. as reflected in the basic notions and philosophy is a sound one. Were the West to adopt a similar qualitative and creative basis, the problems of over-exploitation of natural resources, pollution and over-population will at least become manageable ones.

It is the thesis of this paper that the people of Africa have a consistent world view which underlies most of the everyday thinking and forms the basis for innovative thought. The basic assumptions of this world-view underlies most African thinking South of the Sahara in spite of prolonged and varied contact with both Arab and Western thinking. Using the analytic and synthetic tools of Western philosophy, I hope to show how Bantu thinking differs from the Western world-view – which had parallel but significantly different basic assumptions – in many important ways.

I wished to submit this thesis in 1969, but various reasons; personal and political have made it impossible until now. Objections recorded in 1970 are still operational and a number of further objections have been lodged in the intervening years. These I will deal with later as I do not think they detract from the basic thesis or its significance.

Bantu Philosophy is not concerned with the finding of universals, sets of laws, principles or common denominators. This search has, to a large extent, been the preoccupation of Western philosophy. By Bantu standards rationality and the laws of logic are seen as an attempt to prune the world of its irrational and illogical components in order to make it conform to the sterile pre-requisites of mathematics with its neurotically comforting predictability.

Bantu philosophy is concerned with the diversity, flux, changeability and differentiation of the world. It recognizes the human search for security in this world, but it searches for that security in the creative interaction of diverse elements and especially of human presences. In so doing it must often reject the Western superimposition of theoretical structures which are too often based on the superficial similarities of elements rather than their diversity.

I see a real need for the recognition and acceptance of the variety of cultures on Earth. Africa as the cradle of man has a contribution (perhaps a major one) to offer. Only after recognition will it become possible to borrow from that varied stock those elements that can be creatively fused into a sound basis for a qualitative relationship between man and man and between man and his total environment to fit changing and varied circumstances. This fusion can occur at a personal level to meet the individuals’ particular personality and interests or at an international level to promote e better understanding or a sounder basis for co-operation. It can operate at any level in between.

This thesis is my contribution to try and enhance the acceptability of Africa’s contribution. Africa has something real and significant to contribute to the world. Bantu philosophy does not hold any all-time, radical answers to philosophical questions; it offers an alternative and perhaps more fruitful basis from which to approach problems.

If philosophy consists of asking the most pertinent questions, then the approach of Bantu philosophy may lead to the re-asking of pertinent questions which the West has either ceased to ask or asks only within the narrow and exclusive framework of certain assumptions.

Evolution

One of the mainstays of intolerance towards other cultures and world views by the West is the misinterpretation and misapplication of various theories of evolution. Thus evolution on the Darwinian scale assumes – though seldom explicitly states – that complexity is a sound criterion on which to base an evolutionary scale. Were this assumption to be correct for physiological

evolution – there are valid reasons for this doubt – it is an enormous leap of bad faith to conclude that it is therefore also correct for cultural, psychological or philosophical evolution.

Man is assumed to be the model for and therefore at the apex of the pyramid of biological evolution. To this extent only does a theory of biological evolution have any anthropocentricity in that it treats man as an object in order to give weight to the contention that the scientific method is objective.

When Western man assumed himself to be at the apex of some evolutionary scale of culture, philosophy, civilization, etc., the anthropocentric base becomes an egocentric one and the criteria for comparison often pure prejudice. There have been some attempts to introduce an objective criterion for comparison, one in which the culture’s manipulation (could also read exploitation, disturbance or pollution) of the environment becomes a basis for comparison. This can only be a short-sighted, prejudiced and dangerous ploy.

As Bantu Philosophy is a new field of study – in the sense of having theses written about it – the limitations of the new field and its conceptual framework must be mapped out largely in terms of the known field of study. Although this allows for continuity of thought and facilitates explanation of many aspects of the new field, it can severely limit the new field. This limitation occurs when we try to fit the notions of the new field into the sometimes rigid conceptual framework of established fields of study.

This limiting of the new field is greater in philosophy where the terminology, even the language of the established field, has an assumed conceptual framework which is not the same as that of the new field of study. Thus certain notions that are only analogously referred to in an African language may have no near-equivalent in a European language such as English.

A further difficulty occurs when trying to explain the fluid notions of an oral culture in terms of the often abstract concepts of a written culture.

These problems will, I hope, persuade the reader to exercise extreme patience in the reading of this thesis.

THESIS

1.0 According to Merleau-Ponty, the concept of BEING is the primitive fact of

Western philosophy. The concept of BEING does underlie all Western

philosophy. Aristotle’s definition of ontology as the study of ‘BEING as BEING’ is indicative. The concept of BEING has permeated the complexities of Western languages to such an extent that linguistic analysis is virtually impossible without a basic knowledge of the ontological infra-structure of the language. The concept of BEING is accepted as an assumption before the process of philosophizing starts. Operating at the level of assumption it is not necessarily correct or universally applicable; but any investigation into its validity is bound to raise the hackles of all who have formerly accepted the assumption as necessarily valid.

1.1 I wish to show that the concept of BEING is a pre- or non-qualitative, pseudo-quantitative assumption which nevertheless functions in the conceptual framework as if it was both qualitative and quantitative.

2.0 QUALITY

If we name or assert an object and then list its qualities, we would be adding nothing significant to this list if we were to assert that the object existed. Thus:

Table 2.0

Object Qualities

BALL 1) spherical

2) Made of rubber

3) Hard

4) Multi-coloured

5) Cold to the touch

6) It exists

2.1 Clearly 6) is not the same kind of assertion as 1) to 5). It tells one no more

about the object that is already known. So it is clearly out of place among

the list of qualities. But statements such as ‘This ball exists’ are made. It

would therefore seem more appropriate to place 6) on the object side of the table.

Thus:

Table 2.1

Object Qualities

This BALL exists 1) it is spherical

2) It is made of rubber

3) It is hard

4) It is multi-coloured

5) It is cold to the touch

2.1.1 Notice how the existential assertion about the object brings with it a

quantifier. This will be dealt with in paragraph 3.0 a whole range of

quantifiers could be applied which would grammatically,

but not significantly (i.e. qualitatively), alter the qualities side of the table.

2.1.2 When the quantifier becomes fractional the similar fractional (vulgarly

quantifiable?) must be applied to the qualities side. This does not alter

the list of qualities - not its applicability. In fractions the quantifier is thus

imposed on both sides in a pretty obvious way while the qualities remain

the same.

2.1.3. When the quantifier becomes negative, the qualities can either apply or

become redundant. There are two easily distinguishable ways in which

the quantifier can be negative.

a) Denial of existence e.g. ‘No ball exists’

Here the whole concept of ball is questioned. Qualities no longer make

sense when applied to a non-object and should be attached to another

object which fulfills a similar function to the now redundant BALL.

B) Wrong category. e.g. ‘This is not a ball’.

What is questioned here is whether a specific object falls within the

category of ball. The qualities for the category remain the same. If the

qualities for the category remain the same. If the qualities of a specific

ball-like object under consideration can be shown to be significantly

different from the qualities for the category ‘BALL’ it might suffice to

reclassify ‘this ball-like object’ as falling outside the category ‘BALL’.

2.1.4. Note that in table 2.1 the double ontological assertion on the object side is

transferred to the qualities side as well. Although this is merely a linguistic

transference (i.e. good grammar) it does indicate to what extent the

concept of being forms part of the logical infrastructure of the English

language.

Thus if we were to propose a table between 2.0 and 2.1; it would read

thus:

__________Object_______________________Qualities_____________ BALL-BALL spherical

rubber. etc

We have now analyzed the problem to a standstill. A young child that cries

“Papa, papa, papa” ad nauseam is expressing its doubts about the paternal

presence. It is certainly not making a series of ontological assertions on

successive planes.

2.2 Multiple ontological assertions such as ‘Ball-ball’ and ‘This ball exists’ are

most common in fields of ontological doubt.

Were one to stop in the middle of a ball game, hold the ball in one’s hand

and assert “This ball exists” or “This ball is” the other people participating in the game will probably be somewhat puzzled. They may even doubt

one’s sanity.

Were one to use a ball as an example in a philosophical discussion, an

existential assertion would have considerably more significance for one’s

audience.

Making the assertion “God is” or “God exists” during a religious ceremony,

will have unquestionable significance for the participants in the ceremony.

2.3 Clearly the existence of a ball (insofar as its qualities impinge on the sensory

organs) is seldom called to doubt. On the other hand, doubts as to the

existence of God makes a double ontological statement both meaningful

and significant.

An ontological assertion thus has more to do with doubts in the observer than it has to do with the qualities of an object.

2.4 An ontological assertion seems to function as a non-qualitative assertion

which tells us no more about an object than we already know? It merely

gives us an indication of our own doubts about the object. One could

even claim that for an ontological assertion to make sense, it should strictly

only apply to ‘objects’ that lack normal (generally accepted)

sensory qualities.

Thus an ontological assertion reads as a shorthand for “I suspect the

presence with sensory qualities (i.e. an existence). I would like to express

my awareness of this presence without sensory qualities by making this

ontological assertion”.

The assertion can then be further re-enforced by ascribing to the ‘existence’

certain abstract qualities which, if we ignore their analogous meaning, we

may mistake for sensory qualities. (e.g. ‘God is Omnipotent, Omnipresent;)

or

(this ghost is vague, ethereal, etc’.)

2.5 This all indicates that the ontological standing of an object is a very basic

assumption which underlies any qualitative assertions. When the basic

assumption is called to doubt, the qualities will apply analogously only.

Without the basic assumption, no qualities can be applied to ‘it’. The

ontological assertion or statement (statement of BEING) is thus pre-

qualitative.

3.0 QUANTITY

I repeat table 2.1 here as it is necessary for the analysis of quantity:

Object Qualities

This BALL exists 1) It is spherical

2) It is made of rubber

3) It is hard

4) It is multi-coloured

5) It is cold to the touch

3.1 The existential assertion about the object brings with it a hidden

quantifier. In table 2.0 the object was merely a name/assertion

and the quantity did not matter. It was the concept that was described (qualified) by the list of qualities. Now the object becomes

quantifiable and this quantification also moves to the qualities side. This is merely a grammatical move and not a significant one (as it does not add to or alter the qualities sides). But on the object side it opens the grammatical gap for a whole series or range of quantifiers to creep into. e.g.:

This Ball exists

A ball exists

An infinity of Balls exist, etc.

3.2 When the quantifier becomes fractional, its grammatical

transference to the qualities side becomes automatic. This is because an object is taken as 1 on the mathematical scale (not as 0 is as often wrongly assumed by the existentialists) so any part of the object must affect the qualities. It would be stretching the concept BALL to divide it into fractions so that this vulgar division must be carried over to the qualities side to enable the reader to flesh out the qualities to make a whole quality just as the reader is expected to construct a whole 1

(one ) ball from the list of qualities. Thus:

This quarter BALL exists It is a quarter sphere

The quarter I can perceive is made of rubber

The quarter I feel is hard

Etc.

OR

This half BALL exists It is half round

Etc.

3.3 When the quantifier becomes negative we have a similar distinction in

the nature of the statement as we had under quality in 2.1.3.

A. Denial of existence. E.g. No BALL exists (BALL = 0). There is no quantity or quality to BALL. The object is a theoretic construct that has no existence, therefore has no quantity. It has no being, therefore it has no quantity. We can see from this type of arrangement that the concept of BEING is pre-quantitative. I would rather call it pseudo-quantitative as the grammatical form, “No BALL exists” remains the same as ‘One BALL exists’. Thus the grammatical form could lead one (as several thinkers have been led in the past) to believe the two statements to be similar and therefore have a similar quantitative content. This is only possible if one makes the mistake of assuming 0 (zero) to have quantitative value.

B. Wrong category e.g. ‘This ball does not exist’. Here the quantifier remains the same, it is only the qualities that are different (see 2.1.3.B) and it is they that determine how many ball-like objects fall outside of the accepted category ‘BALL’.

3.4 Double or multiple ontological assertions do not alter the quantity of

the object under discussion (or in doubt). The ontology of the object must first be established before it can be given quantity. The concept BALL must be accepted before one can talk of ONE or MANY balls. The existence of a single ball comes after the concept of BALL which is again preceded by the concept of BEING. The concept of BEING is thus pre-quantitative although its grammatical form may be the same as in quantitative statements.

4.0 Quantification

I will try – without going into subsidiary analysis-point towards some

of the differences between quality and quantity assertions. These

differences may account for the differences in arguments under

paragraphs 2 and 3.

4.1 One way of looking at a quantifier would be to see it as an attempt to

place the qualities – which are not applicable at 0 (zero) – on a

mathematical base. This enables one to deal in theoretic constructs

and to still be able to give them qualities. For example, temperature

as a theoretic construct vanishes at 0 (zero) yet it re-appears as a

minus scale which (theoretically, at least) can extend as far from the

zero (to infinity) as the normal temperature scale can above zero.

4.2 When the object about which we are making an ontological assertion

is vague (e.g. this THING exists), the quantifier tends to be vague as

well (e.g. this BIG THING exists). The quantifier then functions as a

pseudo-quality. In this sense quantification is merely a refined form of

qualification so designed to give the appearance of objectivity to the

essentially subjective process of sensory-based qualification.

4.3 In the history of Western thinking there seems to be a greater stress

on quantification in times of trauma. E.g. the development of

geometry by the warring Greek City States; the numerical comparison

of weaponry between Russia and America during the Cold War;

Vietnam body counts; statistical justification of racial inequalities in

current affairs programs in South Africa; et al. Quantification seems to

make possible the objectification of too many or of traumatic

subjective experiences.

4.4 A quality must first be isolated (e.g. size) then apparently stripped of

evaluative content (e.g. big instead of ‘larger than me’). Only then will

it fit onto the arbitrary but agreed scale which makes it quantifiable

(E.g. weighs 120 on the kilogram scale).

5.0 If the ontological assertion, i.e. the statement of BEING, is primary

to the two modes of human knowledge (quality and quantity) then the

concept of Being must be an assumption made prior to all human

knowledge. The acceptance of the concept, the assumption of its

validity, often accompanied by the rejection of all possible

alternatives, seems to be a logical, linguistic and emotional necessity

before all knowledge in the Western mode. This is what Merleau-

Ponty is getting at when he calls BEING ‘the primitive fact of Western

philosophy’.

6.0 Once we have accepted the concept of BEING as the primitive fact,

we can ascribe to its analogous properties which will tend to be

Somewhat arbitrary and reflect the requirements we feel should be

met by the concept rather than any acceptable inter-subjectivity. The

concept becomes a little like Bishop Berkley’s ‘God-of-the-gaps’.

Otherwise we can list the sensory qualities we require of the concept

of BEING and then submit the list to mathematical quantification. In

everyday speech and language usage, it has become common practice

to accept qualification and quantification as proof of existence (being)

rather than as circumstantial evidence indicating the partial

acceptability of an assumption. This linguistic tendency has pervaded

most of Western thinking. In philosophy it seems to me more relevant

to investigate the implication of an assumption and to consider

alternatives. African thinking can guide us to again asking relevant

questions about such assumptions.

6.1 The concept of BEING appears to be a concept of extremes. It is

either so all-encompassing as to make any ontological assertion

tautological; or it is so specific as to be indistinguishable from

qualitative and quantitative assertions. The concept of BEING seems

to have little relevance in the vast area of its application between

these extremes. If we accept the concept of BEING as a pre-logical

assumptions (a primitive fact), the reasons for its ‘concept of

extremes’ appearance become obvious. The concept has been

accepted as underlying most everyday knowledge and it is only when

it is applied to the limits, the extremes of everyday knowledge (too

general or too specific) that we become aware of our unquestioning

acceptance of this primitive fact.

6.2 The Greek ‘miracle’ took place against a background of social unrest,

foreign invasion and constant bickering between the city states. The

security – both personal and social – obtainable from an explicable,

rule-following and law-abiding universe in times of stress, is very

valuable. The mathematical basis for the universe proposed by the

Pythagoreans must have had tremendous appeal.

Trying to discover whether the concept of Being as a philosophical

assumption or the idea of a measurable universe came first would

only be of mild historical interest. It is more important to see both as

attempts to create order in the chaos of the Aegean area and its

trading empire.

Since the Greek innovation, the treatment of man as a measurable

quantity with definable qualities has managed to keep Europe in an

unbelievable state of turmoil. The only escape from the chaos

seemed to be the quiet backwater of rationality. The explanation of

the mathematical model did have some advantages:

If zero is taken as the midpoint, numbers spread to infinity in both

directions, positive and negative. History can extend as far back as

written records or archeological finds will let it and the future is also

seen as a relatively long time projection. The ability to relate past,

present and future on a time continuum has made it possible (though

not with any noticeable success rate as yet) to plan and provide for

the future. With the objectification of time and space, all human

activity can gradually be withdrawn from subjectivity and crammed

into the explicable objectivities of the scientific method, evolutionary

theory and technical superiority. Western thought has moved away

from the anthropocentric universe to one which – though still

largely anthropomorphic in qualities – has become mathematically

quantitative.

6.3 In this universe – as seen by Western eyes – Being has become a

quantitative reality. With Being the primitive fact of Western

philosophy, the quantitative value of a void and the mathematical

value of zero (0) present major problems. Both a void and zero are

definable only in negativistic terms. Thus NOTHING is definable only in

negativistic terms. Thus NOTHING is definable only in terms of things,

i.e. NO-THING. It is patently obvious how this has become built into

the language. Given the limitations of knowledge about things, the

definition of NOTHING is not accurately quantifiable and must remain

abstract. Zero has been termed ‘a mathematical abstraction’ as this

term better preserves the contradictory nature of to concept zero.

6.4 If one were to propose as the primitive fact of a philosophy a

qualitative reality (instead of the quantitative reality of BEING) a void

and zero do not present problems. Zero is merely the lower limit of

pseudo-quality of enumeration. A void would merely mark the edge of

normative behaviour, speech and grammar. Beyond that loosely

definable (distinguishable) edge one must propose different modes of

awareness; a different language and certainly a more sensitive modus

operandi for the discovery and communication of its content. This is

the world of magic and wonder and – like the world of easily

communicable sense date – must be treated with care and respect;

even reverence.

7.0 Both Jahn and Tempels suggest that the ZIM root of BAZIMA/BAZIMU

distinction designates existence. Like well-trained Western thinkers

they do not question the concept of BEING, they merely look for a

near-equivalent in African thinking. If one is looking for something

ardently enough – and few would doubt their ardour or persistence –

and one is prepared to stretch the evidence a little (or grade it on

some pseudo-evolutionary scale) one will find what one is looking for.

But the root ZIM, although made more common by bad European

translation of phonetically rich African languages, is still not near

common enough to be the African equivalent of an existential

assertion. Even if it is the common linguistic root between the earthly

and ancestral spheres in several West African languages as Jahn

claims; this would rather indicate that the two spheres of earthly and

ancestral are not as easily seperable by the ‘moment of death’ as

Western thinking assumes.

7.1 A similar superficial linguistic analysis of the Zulu language could come

up with the root ONA which would be the equivalent of Evil. Such a

concept would no doubt suit missionaries, but it would make any

Zulu collapse in uncontrollable laughter. The danger of this sort of

superimposed analysis should be avoided. It is far too easy to

generalize in a Western language. The absence of a written language

in Africa and Western theories of cultural evolution provide enough

plaster to fill the crevasses in the poor construct resulting from such

analyses.

8.0 The PRESENCE of John, men, animals, plants, stones, laughter,

rhythm, etc in the universe impinges on other presences in the

universe in a variety of ways. The simplistic division of the senses

into the five associated with sensory organs in the Western mode of

knowledge is too limited to account for the almost infinite variety of

ways that presences can impinge on each other. The qualitative

reality of presences require a more open,further-ranging and

more varied range of senses to adequately describe the variety of

ways presences can impinge on each other.

8.1 The traditional Western way of lumping all senses not

classifiable under the five traditional organ-related senses into one

vague ‘sixth’ sense, is totally inadequate to describe the variety of

ways presences can impinge on each other. The Western ‘sixth’ sense

is an attempt to gather under a single blanket concept all the ragged

edges of the universe that will not easily fit within the too tight

limitations of the organ-related senses.

8.2 When the traditional Western range of five senses is widened by the

often grudging admission of a grab-bag ‘sixth sense’. it is to be

expected that another type of knowledge (other than that based on

the traditional five senses) becomes not only possible, but likely.

Unfortunately this new knowledge is bound to be defined in terms of

the other five senses (on which our whole language structure is based)

no matter how contradictory, vague or tautological the definitions.

Thus we get ‘new’ sciences such as ‘para-psychology’

‘astro-archeology’, etc.

8.3 If the senses are seen as the ‘window onto the outside world’,

then all that the ‘sixth sense’ can do it to broaden the view a little.

This is inadequate. What is required is a variety of openings through

which the outside and inside can interact in a variety of ways.

This wider possibility African Philosophy encourages, through

proposing a large but incomplete range of senses.

8.4 This wider range of senses covers most of the range of

qualitative reactions between presences (of which the interaction

of man and man and of man and the universe are of primary

importance to philosophy). Each of these senses has its ethical

parameters and moral prerogatives. These I leave for those better

equipped than I to investigate and discuss. Note that the Western

‘sixth sense’ seldom – if ever – brings with it any moral obligation.

Westerners with ‘unusual perceptions’ regard themselves as above

moral restraints, often even above the law.

8.5 The range of African senses will be illustrated in an appendix. The

known part of this wider range can be fitted into three modes of

sensibility and still give a more qualitative description of the universe

and man’s interaction in and with it. The three modes of sensibility

operate at and beyond the Western organ-based five senses. The

three modes form a loose structural network for the consideration and

discussion of senses. They may be a logical construct which, no

matter how much circumstantial evidence is submitted for their

recognition, may never be recognized or considered important by an

African thinker. I think they are important only to bridge the gap

between African and Western world views.

8.6 If these three modes of sensibility can give a more qualitative view of

the universe, their co-relation with the basic assumption of PRESENCE

will give a wider view of the world than the concept of BEING with its

five senses.

8.7 The three modes of sensibility in African thinking I would put as

follows:

a) Outgoing Mode.

The sense of sight, vested in the external buds of the brain would

be a prime example of this mode. But it would not include vision,

dreams or introspection. This is the mode in which different

presences in the universe impinge on a presence in a normal and

acceptable inter-subjective way. The mode is best seen from the

point of view of a personal presence and it involves the superficial

overview (I prefer the word scanning) of the universe.

b) Contact Mode

In this mode the senses are operating from both (or more)

presences. It is thus in a state of flux as both presences can

change continually. It is the mode of interaction. It is the modal

basis of I/Thou relationships between presences.

c) Reactive Mode

This is the mode of sensibility with which the presence reacts

toward the impingement of other presences upon it. It is

essentially a private mode, but can become known to other

presences by means of the other two modes.

All three of these modes overlap and all three can occur in a single

reaction. The division into modes is merely an analytical tool to

facilitate the explanation of the wider range of senses.

8.8 If the African world-view is anthropocentric, as most writers claim, it

would have to hold that man’s presence is central and that in this

universe other presences (e.g. stars, stones, trees, etc.) usually

impinge to a lesser degree than does one’s own presence or the

presences of other people. Exceptions to this would be taken as

indicative of unusual states such as mental illness. Trance, prophecy.

etc/

9.0 I wish to propose that the impinging on the senses of one presence by

another/others is the qualitative reality, the primitive fact of African

philosophy.

9.1 If I apply the sort of analysis that I have used in 2.1.3. to the concept of

BEING, then a) Denial of existence’ does not apply. I am not denying

the primitive fact of any philosophy. Neither am I saying that the

concept of BEING does not fit into the category of ‘primitive fact’ as in

paragraph 2.1.3B. I am merely proposing that there are other

concepts, ideas, notions, (whatever) that also qualify for the role of

‘primitive fact’!

9.2 If this proposal is acceptable, there remains only one possible way of

denying the presence of an African world view, a Bantu Philosophy.

That would be to commit the same mistake as Tempels, Jahn, Mabona,

Kangame and several others make. The mistake of equating their

primitive fact (elan vitale for Tempels, Ntu for Jahn, mathematics for

Mabone, etc.) with the concept of being. After their analyses, they

ignore the qualitative differences between their primitive fact and the

concept of BEING. Where the differences are too blatant to be

ignored, they dismiss them as lower on a scale of cultural evolution.

What they are saying at the end of their analyses is that Africa is

behind Europe on an evolutionary scale and that this assumed

backwardness applies to African thinking as well. The old, even more

primitive bugbear of prejudice, again raises its head and precludes a

comparative study of ‘primitive facts’!

9.3 Two or more primitive facts need not necessarily be similar in order to

fill the same psychological niche in the world view of a single person or

the philosophy of a continent. BEING and PRESENCE as two such

primitive facts seem to be able to co-habit in a practical framework a

lot better than the people of Europe and Africa have been able to.

There is no need to compare primitive facts on any scale of

development or evolution.

9.4 I would suggest that for me to try to define PRESENCE any closer, to

try conceptualizing or analyzing it, to seek any linguistic equivalents in

European languages, would merely contribute to the reduction of

this qualitative reality to a quantitative one.

9.5 This is my thesis. All I can do is – by way of notes, appendices, etc. try

to show how PRESENCE operates. It may help to make a consistent

and valid assessment of those practices, actions, beliefs, etc. that have

puzzled non-Africans for so long.

ALTERNATIVELY

The previous analysis could be led from the other end; thus:-

The concept of BEING in Western philosophy is non qualitative and

pre-quantitative; it can therefore not be derived from the senses and thus, on

most phenomenological theories, we can have no knowledge of it.

It must therefore be a pre-knowledge assumption which is either

1) The primitive fact underlying all Western philosophy

or

2) The skeletal remains of a sensory experience stripped of quality and

quantity.

In contrast to this problematic concept of Being, Presence is still a sensory

experience with both quality and quantity and merely underlies all Bantu thinking

because of its universal applicability. Q.E.D.

CAUSALITY

Causality is the assumed relationship between the cause (statement, antecedent)

and the effect (conclusion, consequent). To claim causal law as a significant concept - as does scientific thinking – is to make a tautological statement of

considerable dimension.

Thus:- C → E

The explosion caused the landslide.

cause = effect

C → E

But also: If the causal law applies then effect will always follow cause.

cause = effect

So we see that the causal law itself must be couched in the causal form for it to

acquire validity. The tautological nature of causality points towards its self-imposed limitation. It is merely a way of interpreting the world. It is one of many

ways of trying to explain the universe; approximately on a par with Bishop Berkley’s ‘God-of-the-gaps’. And this in spite of its much vaunted and over-used

‘scientific validity’. It is a limited way of looking at the world and the easy and

simplified formulae we derive from applying causal laws give a very good

indication of these limits.

A further limitation on causality is – as Sapir puts it – ‘that the ability to express causal relations does not imply the ability to conceive causality as such’. In

Western thinking this may mislead us as it is the ‘causality as such’ that underlies

most of our ethical thinking. The ability to express casual relations is even taken as a rule of thumb test for normalcy (and culpability) by courts of law.

I would go one stage beyond Sapir and claim ‘that the ability to express PROPER causal relations does not imply the ability conceive of causality as such’.

The psychopathic murderer would otherwise get the death penalty for claiming that the worms in his head caused the death of his victims.

It is this limitation that has been the root of so much misinterpretation by ethnographers. As Western educated ‘scientists’ that are looking for causal explanations among people for whom – if it is recognized at all – it is merely another inadequate way of trying to explain the world.

Example

In history we learn the socio-economic and political causes of the Second World War. A Luo tribesman who fought in that was explained that there was a big war because so many people wanted to fight. This would have been the way an ethnographer would have recorded his ‘causal’ thinking. What the Luo really said was, “Very many people wanted to fight. We had a big war. When everybody wanted to go home, the war stopped.”

If causality is merely one way – and not a very adequate one at that – of explaining phenomena, it is interesting to try and comprehend why it is so popular among Western thinkers.

1) It ignores the ragged edges of the phenomena. Both the phenomena (effect) and the cause are trimmed to fit firstly the limiting logic of language and secondly the even more limiting syllogistic form of the causal law.

2) It is a handy way to make generalizations sound like ‘facts’ or laws which can then be scientifically ‘proven’. In other words, we actually argue from a number of ‘i’ proposition to an ‘a’ proposition. This is the hidden process behind the so-called ‘creative scientific thinking’. With an ‘ah-ha’ or ‘eureka’ reaction of discovery, we then propose the ‘a’ proposition as a new scientific theory and merrily enumerate as many ‘i’ propositions as will suffice to ‘prove’ the validity of the theory. Those ‘i’

propositions that contradict the ‘a’ proposition, we blissfully ignore or rationalize away as the exceptions that prove (test) the rule.

3) It allows for the ignoring of peripheral factors. We can thus scientifically alter the structure of the raw materials to make plastics and ignore the ecological disaster that the non-biodegradable plastics bring with them.

4) It has produced spectacular results; it has launched the industrial revolution while enabling us to ignore the social implications of urbanization. It has made possible the techno-electronic revolution which put man in space (and created Star Wars) while ignoring what man is doing to himself and the biosphere.

5) With the Western mind’s love for simplification and universalization, (another form of simplification) the causal syllogism is sufficiently flexible to fit most speculation, scientific or otherwise. It is a grab-bag concept that will contain almost anything. Those few concepts that don’t fit can usually be squeezed in as ‘negative causality’ a contradiction that boggles the mind.

Causality as an ‘explain all’ concept has become very popular in Western languages. Children learn that ‘why’ questions get the most positive reaction from their parents and teachers and soon learn that causal answers to ‘why’ questions are the most acceptable.

The Western concept of causality embodies a ‘constant relation between antecedent and consequent’. This constancy would – and has – lead to the rigidity of application of causal law where there is only sufficient evidence to posit a coincidental concomitance. Thus if I walk past a tree and an egg falls next to me, it is a coincidence. But should an egg fall down close to me three or more consecutive times, each time I walk near a certain tree, I will start to posit a causal link. It may be a far-fetched causal link like the mother bird trying to feed me or a cuckoo chick getting rid of the competition early on being frightened by my presence. If, after the tenth passing and the tenth egg, and the eggs no longer fell, I could retain the causal link but merely put a limitation of time on its applicability. Thus: If I walk under that tree between April 5th and 15th, then an egg will fall next to me.

This brings us to an important aspect of causality. The antecedent and consequent must occur in a recognizable time frame. The antecedent must occur before the consequent in the time continuum and they must not be too far apart (unless specified) for causality to be assumes. Thus Supernova 1987a can only be causally connected with a stellar implosion in the Megellanic Cloud area 170,000 years ago when we specify the vast distances light has to travel and at what speed. But for most causality antecedent and consequent occur almost simultaneously and their division along the time continuum a matter of micro-seconds. Antecedent and consequent may be a single event which is artificially separated in order to be able to apply the causal law.

The spatial parameters of the antecedent and consequent must also be such that a causal link is plausible. One would have difficulty establishing a causal link between nasal twitches in South Africa and the death of silk worms in North China unless one had previously convinced the listener of ‘lines of energy running through the core of the earth connecting diametrically opposed geographical areas’.

Causality as understood in the West cannot exist outside the assumed framework of rationality. Physical causality assumes the existence of rationally explicable physical laws. Legal causality often even assumes intentionality within a rational framework; otherwise it is classified as careless, accidental, unfortunate, etc.

Causality is one of the mainstays of the Christian proof of the existence of God. The assumptions of Christian theism are largely based on the acceptance of God as the Prime Cause.

In Western thinking we have a strange distinction between what is termed ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ causality. Thus:-

A killed (caused the death of) B.

Without A wielding the murder weapon, we would not have the death of B.

A’s action and B’s death stand in a direct causal relation. This is ‘primary’ causality.

I am not so sure that A’s insults did not cause B’s suicide.

Here B might have committed suicide without A’s insults. We are positing A’s insults as an additional factor in the consequent death of B. We posit the theory in a cautious linguistic framework (doubt and denial phrase and double negative). Here, if the theory is acceptable, we are dealing with contributory or secondary causality.

In ethics – and law – this becomes an important division. Only primary causality implies moral responsibility and legal censure. Secondary causality implies a measure of social disapproval and in law is often quoted as mitigating circumstances.

The tendency of science to expand the scope of causal relationships to a wider field than that to which it was designed to apply, has been taken over by ethical thinkers in the West. There have been attempts to find a universal ethic. This is not a new tendency. The Old Testament Commandments are one attempt at establishing such a universal ethic, but one that left many loop-holes. Thou shall not covet thy neighbours’ wife – while he is alive and strangers’ wives are O.k., etc.

The penile code of Hamurabi is another

But with the expansion of causality in the field of ethics, all we have done is widen

the field while proportionately decreasing the depth of moral responsibility. We now talk about the ethics of environmental pollution while feeling less and less responsible for our deeds towards family and friends.

Kantian ethics (according to W T Jones’s interpretation) requires that we feel responsible for our actions; i.e. that our feelings follow the causal links. This is what has happened. We only feel responsible if we can establish causal links and the human ability to rationalize its actions has made us question even very plausible causal links in order to avoid responsibility. So too our sense of responsibility has widened but become more shallow.

But what would happen to our ethics, to our sense of moral responsibility if we had no concept of causality? This will be dealt with under ethics.

Bantu notions of causality are far less rigid that those of the West. The ability to express causal links is there but the desire to accept causality as such (as a rule or law) is missing. It is far too one-sided to be a law; it leaves too many possibilities out of consideration.

Instead of awareness of a constant relation between antecedent and consequent as in Western causality, in Bantu notions there is recognition of tendencies for concomitance. These tendencies can be strengthened by goal-oriented activity. Such goal-related activity can vary from incantation to prayer, from using strengthening medicine to group therapy; from biding one’s time to active participation; from neglect to counter-activity; each of which brings with it varying degrees of moral responsibility.

Three examples may suffice:

Example 1 Causal words

English cause Xhosa ukubanga

English I killed B (caused the death of) by stabbing him.

Xhosa (only used with the intransitive form of verbs)

I helped B to die by stabbing him.

The Xhosa ‘confession’ will never be spoken in isolation. It will be combined with a number of other contributing “causes”. B reduced my father’s presence in the council by his constant bickering. B frightens my sister so that she does not visit her friends. My mother did not discourage me when she found me sharpening the knife. X did not ask me what was troubling me when I met him on my way to

B’s house. B shouted insults and threw stones at me – as one would at a dog – when I approached his house.

All these causes would be taken into account when passing sentence and all contributors would be responsible for their share of the fine.

Example 2 Causality Within a Time Frame

A looser concept of time and space in which times and places only derive significance from the context of the human events that took place then and there, also loosens the rigidity of the ‘causality’ but in no way reduces the moral responsibility which results from participation in an act.

A friend is killed in a car accident soon after a violent argument. Just before he left I told him angrily that I never wanted to see him again in my life. As a Westerner, I might establish a tentative causal link between the argument and the accident. He was upset with me and was not concentrating on his driving. I would feel mildly responsible, but should I then discover that he was not driving or that the driver of the other car involved in the accident was careless; that would cut all causal links and with it any feeling of responsibility on my part.

As an African there is an obvious link between my anger, the argument and the accident. Even if the accident were to happen several months later and in a distant place, my moral responsibility would only be reduced if:

1) I had learnt that my friend had argued and fought with several other people.

2) I had learnt that my friend had apologized to several other people about our argument and would probably – had the opportunity arisen – have apologized to me.

3) I had sought him out, apologized and we had become friends again.

This obvious link, which carries very little trace of causality with it, yet a very real moral responsibility (I would at least slaughter a goat to feed mutual friends and send another to his parents), is a result of the Bantu notion of Presence. Good friends, feasting, consideration, etc. would increase both me and my friend’s presence. Anger, arguments, etc. would reduce both.

Example 3 Different types of causality

In the Nuer and Masai languages, as well as in Swahili, three forms of causality are distinguished. Ethnographers have ascribed this to Islamic influence but there is adequate evidence to seriously doubt that theory. The distinctions are quite in keeping with Bantu thinking.

The three forms may be named:-

1) proximate or physical – implying direct responsibility

2) ultimate or historical – avoiding responsibility

3) magical or contributory – implying partial responsibility.

James Chaka, like his namesake, made people tremble with his anger.

1) James Chaka made people tremble – proximate, physical causality

implying direct responsibility.

2) Chaka, his famous namesake, made people tremble – ultimate, historical causality in which responsibility is no longer a question. He just did.

3) Used together in this way implies a magical causality. James was not quite himself; his famous namesake was acting through him, he must have been bewitched to be so angry, etc. A contributory cause implying

shared or divided responsibility.

Magic

Magic is a sort of stop-gap concept which only applies if the law of causality is not accepted as a universal. If the consequent is not causally connected to the antecedent, yet someone behaves as if it were; we Westerners tend to classify the connection as magical. We do not realize that it is our limiting concept of causality and our related attempt to try make causal ‘law’ a universal ‘natural’

law that leads us to this classification. When that ‘natural law’ does not apply we use the concept of magic to fill the gaps. The term is slightly pejorative, it is paternalistic and it is hopelessly inaccurate.

Magic for Africa is the understandable application of goal-related activity aimed at the solution of a personal or social problem. To a Westerner this application is misunderstood because it is not causal. A magical ‘cause’ or explanation for a Westerner would be one that does not follow the causal law and has no scientific validity. For the African it is merely a goal-related activity aimed at making a probability out of a mere possibility.

A magical explanation for a given phenomenon should not be seen as a primitive substitute for a scientific explanation. It is rather an anthropocentric, mystical explanation (e.g. It is God’s will) with the understanding that a magical explanation is a wider one which can incorporate both religio-mystical and scientific explanations with contradiction.

Chance

Magic has nothing to do with chance. If an African had to attribute a chance occurrence to a magical reason, he would be thought mentally unbalanced.

Example: I am a murderer because someone in the next village with the same name committed murder.

This would be regarded as just ludicrous (and funny) as attributing drought to the advent of the mini-skirt in Western thinking.

Thus hippo fat may have no rational, causal connection with human pregnancy. Yet the easy association of ideas between a rounded hippo and a pregnant woman is not too difficult to follow. Any pregnant woman will tell you the sensuousness of a distended belly and the sheer physical joy of rubbing it with an appropriate lubricant. In addition the psychosomatic value of placebo medicines has not yet – in Africa – been replaced by the somatically effective but psychologically empty chemical-therapy of Western medicine.

Hippo fat is an example of a chance association becoming established as a traditional medicinal practice through an association of ideas.

Fatalism

Fatalism as a concept, a mind-set – is unknown in Africa. All phenomena can be acted upon, interfered with or altered by the active presence of a single human. The muntu is as powerful as his ability to make effective his choice to act or interfere. For the Westerner with his limited – and often destructive – capacity for participating in the world around him; the Bantu choice not to do anything about a certain set of circumstances looks like all the negative aspects of fatalism.

Freedom of choice is an important assumption in Africa. Even the choice to do nothing, even the dereliction of duty, carries with it its moral obligations. A chief who neglects the proper sacrifice and rain-making ceremony at the beginning of the planting season, is just as responsible as the man who witnesses murder being done and does not interfere to prevent it.

Determinism is a concept foreign to Africa. All events happen; such is the order of things. Sometimes human agents interfere and make them happen slightly differently. But the events would have happened anyway. Sartre’s assumption that magic is only used when causal determinism fails is totally wrong for Africa where causality is too narrow an explanation for the variety of events and determinism becomes a ludicrous, self-important misinterpretation.

What the West classifies as magic can better be seen as the observable manifestation of the intention to try making a probability out of a possibility through creative action (goal-related activity). Failure to participate in this creative process would be idleness, not fatalism.

Ethics and Responsibility

What would happen to our ethics, to our sense of moral responsibility if we had no concept of causality? The traditional answer is that without causality there can be no ethics; therefore people in Africa who have very little idea of causality are amoral, primitive, backward, etc. This type of answer is in keeping with race prejudice, cultural superiority and all the other quirks if mind Westerners used to rationalize firstly the slave trade, then the colonial period and now the economic exploitation of the continent.

Yet many missionaries and Westerners who have lived in or close to African societies attest to the high sense of moral responsibility. A quote from an old French missionary in Cameroon might illustrate this: “I only teach them how I think they should live as Christians; they show me how to live, whether Christian or pagan.”

Ethical norms cannot have a final subjective referent. In Western ethics an appeal is usually made to a supra-human referent (e.g. Ten Commandments, God’s word, Christ’s teachings, etc.) In Africa the anthropocentric base of social norms embedded in an oral tradition is sufficient acceptable inter-subjectivity for it to be the final referent for ethical norms. The intrinsic unity of human sensual experiences of other presences makes the Western subjective/objective dichotomy inapplicable.

In Bantu ethics all association carries with it moral responsibility for what happens peripheral to that association. If I trip in the street, a half dozen people will apologize. They are using the same street and by association feel a measure of responsibility for my mishap. An apology, a hand to help me up, kicking the stone loose that I tripped over and removing it, are acts which indicate the differing levels to which people feel responsible.

If I murder Mxasa, a man from a distant village and the compensation was set at fifty head of cattle, I would probably only have to pay twenty or thirty of them. A friend who leant me the murder weapon, my father who did not teach me to restrain my anger, even the aunt who neglected to patch the quarrel between Mxasa and I, would share responsibility for the act and contribute to the compensation to be paid his family.

A chief who neglects the rain-making ceremony at the beginning of the planting season will be held (and made to feel) responsible for drought, late rains or even a crop that was not as good as the previous year. If he has the means, compensation for his neglect will be claimed from him. He may even lose his

chieftainship.

If someone gets lost in an area where I live, I am partly responsible. So, as an African, I will ask strangers where they are going so that I can advise them on the safest route.

The Nuer distinguish between two classes of spacio-temporal referents:-

1) Ecological – pertaining to a presence in spacio-temporal relation to his environment.

2) Structural – pertaining to a presence in spacio-temporal relation to his society. (i.e. his clan members, family, age-mates, tribe, etc).

Ethics obviously only applies (by definition) to structural referents. By an easy extension via such concepts as communal land usufruct, family cattle ownership, etc. the same principles are applied to the ecological referents.

-=Time and Space

It is assumed that when Western philosophers write about Time and Space, that there is some general agreement between them about the range and applicability of the concept. Yet there is a tremendous range of significance attached to the concepts, varying from Kant’s “forms of pure reason” to Dewey’s useful forms to cope with conflict or challenge

If this variety occurs in a written culture, we may expect – and find – even greater variety in an oral culture. It would seem to be more accurate to talk of times and places in Bantu thinking. Neither have any significance other than the interaction

of human presences which fill them and give them importance and meaning. Thus we find that in mythopoetic time neither the past, present, future or even the time continuum is normative. The myth can dip in and out of tenses in remarkable (and to the Westerner, very confusing) ways. The myth’s presences rather than the time scale is normative.

This contrasts fairly radically with other mythopoeia time. E.g.:

Minoan and Greek - present

Egyptian - past

Hebrew - future tenses were normative.

J.S Mbiti covers the question of Time and Space in Bantu Philosophy adequately and at a level appropriate to this thesis.

RECOGNITION

An important aspect of the muntu/presence-in-the-world is the idea of recognition. Recognition reflects the level of awareness at which the muntu/presence is operating. This is not a constant level, but fluctuates. The fluctuations, however, have a consistency as the factors influencing them are recognizable.

Thus recognition of the geological sense when a M’Thonga tribesman experiences his first earth tremor, would upgrade the level of awareness of the muntu/presence. He would then be able to feel a tunnel collapse in the streets of Johannesburg and recognize it as a small earth-shiver.

Recognition of another muntu/presence is of the utmost importance. The other muntu/presence must be assessed in relation to one’s own presence and the appropriate greeting made. Thus in M’Pondo one has a choice of at least fifteen forms of greeting, as reflected by the other muntu/presence; only the greeting range would vary approximately as follows:-

1. A chief, a powerful man on horseback, a man dressed in feast regalia

- Mhlekazi (beautiful one)

8. An age-mate, another strong man, a respected person

- Bayete M’bane (greetings friend)

15. Someone feeling very sorry for themselves

- E’Molo (It is just another day)

These greetings must be adjusted to how one’s own muntu/presence is being projected in relation to the other’s presence. Errors in judgment are allowed, but usually evoke laughter which in itself upgrades the level of the meeting/greeting.

It does not require much imagination to realize how this selective form of greeting places the contact between the two presences immediately at a level of awareness and recognition where creative interchange can take place.

Recognition of the presence of a quarry in a hunt would probably not be in a verbal form as this may frighten away the quarry. From a distant dune and a telescope I have watched a San hunter approach some riverine scrub. His right hand made the sign for buffalo as soon as he became aware of her even though he was hunting alone. His gestures then told me that she was female and pregnant (details I could not see). After a short spell of watching her, the hunter gestured for her to keep calm and carry on grazing while the hunter went his way to find more appropriate game for a quarry.

A Bomvana fisherman will grunt rhythmically while reeling in a cob or grunter, “To calm the fish” he will explain.

An M’Pondo crayfisherman will cackle at and gesture two feeler-like fingers at a crayfish trapped in a tidal pool. He will claim it is to warn the crayfish that he is about to be caught.

A sacrificial ox will be sung to by the whole gathering and will stand docile and relaxed before the instantaneous death of a spear-blade between the atlas and axis vertebrae. The explanation given is “Otherwise the meat will be tough” and “He must sigh before his breast-bone touches the ground”.

Recognition of presences other that muntu/presences and kintu/presences (into which the above three examples would fall) would fall under the umbrella of a wider range of senses. Thus earthquakes would fall under the geological sense. Awareness of the rhythms of the sea would be a maritime sense.

A Western thinker might well argue that a geographical sense and a maritime sense are two aspects of the same sensibility. But this argument would only stand if one were to abstract the qualitative and quantitative content from the sensual experience and treat the sense as a mode of experience/perception.

Bantu perception tends to deal with the what while Western perception concentrates on the how.

Recognition of the qualitative and quantitative variety of perception, recognition of the two-way interaction of all sensual perceptions and recognition of the muntu/presence as central to the perceived world are the three important recognitions of Bantu perceptual divisions, theories, words, etc.

SENSES

Primary to all senses is an awareness of the value of the information obtained through the impinging of phenomena upon each other. It also assumes that one of these phenomena is somehow closer related to the ‘self’ that others.

In Western phenomenology the ‘self’ has become almost totally identified with the personal ‘being’. As a result the West has difficulty with explaining different levels of ‘self awareness’; a difficulty which remains the bugbear of psychology. Awareness of the ‘other’ presents far less difficulty and there has been a marked tendency in Western phenomenology to class all awareness of the ‘other’ as awareness of the same type. Small, qualitative differences are, however, recognized and have lately – since existentialism – become the basis for the building of diverse phenomenological theories (Sense-datum theories, I/Thou I/It relations, etc.)

If the senses are seen as the windows through which this awareness can take place (always remembering that a window is a two-way opening allowing interaction) then in Western phenomenology we have a further simplification. We have a simplified division of the senses through which this awareness can take place. The first sense of ‘sight’ is given as the most complete window for awareness and the other four of “hearing, taste, touch and smell” are usually given as less complete or even as merely complementary to “sight”. Al senses that do not fall easily into this division are lumped together as some vague grab-bag called “the sixth sense”. The awareness that “sight” gives us of ourselves is variously re-classified as self-knowledge (the Greek maxim of ‘know thyself’) introspection and similar vague classes.

In Bantu phenomology the “self” is a variable; incomplete without a social context (Robinson Crusoe would have been a goat) and qualitative identity. Several senses lead the “self” to awareness of “its” (pleasantly neutral) PRESENCE. They help to establish a qualitative awareness, variable according to circumstances and especially according to the impingement of other presences. The other presences that impinge in the most spectacular way are – for a person – the presences of other people. So most of the other senses relate to other human presences and cover (and widen) the windows of awareness through which they can relate.

By analogy from these senses – or by a different third set – a presence (or presences) can relate to seemingly non-living things. E.g. environment, climate, earthquake, the sea, etc.

In Bantu psychology there is no self-contradiction between the Id and the Ego; any apparent contradictions are merely a sensory unawareness or an inability to interpret the information properly.

In Bantu sociology – and its expedient branch of politics - there is no contradiction between self-interest and the greatest good for all. An individual’s inability to project his presence as a level where it becomes important to take it into account in the overall scheme of things (whether sociological or political) is his own fault. If a presence is powerful enough to make itself felt, yet is ignored, it will make itself felt anyway until it can no longer be ignored.

In the Bantu sense of place (sociological place has usually been misinterpreted by the West as nationalism while geographical place has been thought of as a weak form of patriotism) the presence is unquestioned. The basic rights accorded to a presence have varied historically as in the West, but have always been accepted as the lowest common denominator. Historically they have varied from the cannon fodder of the Zulu impi’s to the little princes of Angoni childhood. This historical variation does not alter the basic precept that without rights and freedoms, one has inoperable presences. Presence requires the lowest common denominator of rights and freedom to function. If a presence is declared outlaw, its status as a human presence is removed. In declaring an outlaw a paramount chief will state publically, “He is no longer a man, he is just so much meat”.

The basic rights accorded to a presence will also vary with the projection of that presence (a chief is a chief in the eyes of the people). This is the qualitative variable of Presence which is so different from the assumed invariability of BEING as a ‘primitive fact’ underlying a philosophy.

About the best service I can render is to list some of the Bantu senses as they are recognized by various African peoples South of the Sahara. Not every people load the individual sense with the same importance. The geographical sense of a Comoran islander will be different to that for a Masai plainsman. A geological sense will be more acute for an Afar living in the volcanic Danakil Depression than it will be for an M’thonga living on the stable sand-flats of Southern Maputo.

I will merely name them and loosely classify them into three modalities. If these modalities seem different to those given in paragraph 8.7, it is because any classification is pretty arbitrary, my own and meant only to serve as a temporary bridge between Western and Bantu thinking.

I will leave greater and more detailed analysis to someone better read and trained in phenomenology. i.e. African or bantu phenomenology.

The last section will consist of a series of aphorisms by means of which I merely hope to simulate thinking in the right direction.

LISTS OF SENSES

1) Developmental sexual.

I am becoming a man.

I feel many generations stirring between my thighs.

I no longer need a young wife.

An awareness of having reached a certain stage of psycho-sexual

development.

2) Hormonal balance.

Today the boy, the man and the old man in I are at peace with each other.

I desire nothing but to sleep alone without resting.

A sense of hormonal and sexual equilibrium and functional balance.

3) Kundilini – sexual projection.

Her eyes spoke to me across all the people at the feast.

She danced the way young maize sprouts for good earth.

A projection of fecundity, sexual receptivity. fruitfulness, etc.

4) Self-vision.

I know that my body wishes to dance.

My arms spread like a bird’s wings on the wind.

People look up at me.

The qualitative content of self-awareness.

5) Visual – of other presences.

I know that you are angry.

I see you are weary.

6) Kinetic.

I know that I am holding three fingers behind my back.

My muscles are stiff for exercise.

7) Tactile.

I feel that softness of a baby’s skin.

The sea glides past me.

8) Taste – other than on tongue.

I know the metallic taste of copper T during

intercourse.

I taste a storm coming from the sea.

9) Taste ( buds with smell)

I know this food is fresh and good.

10) Hearing of sounds.

That is a loud noise.

I hear human voices.

11. Hearing (rhythm, music, pace, poetry, etc.)

The drums speak to me from afar.

The words sound plain but the poem speaks.

Rhythm lifted me up for the dance.

12) Smell.

I smell clean air.

That cabbage smells rotten.

13) Olfactory.

I smell fear in my opponent.

I smell the rebellion of my stomach to last night’s drinking.

I smell sickness and death in the village we are approaching.

14) Homeostatic balance.

My blood pulses with the sun.

15) Order in the world.

The earth is as it pleases all people.

All muntus sing together today.

Today even the grasses wish to fight each other.

16) Cinga (thought, idea, inspiration.)

The thought of peace occurred to me during the fighting.

To live well one does not need money.

All men should love each other.

17) Ingamabewu (word seed, generative idea at the edge of verbalization.)

The old fisherman planted word seeds in my ear and the rocking of many boats on many seas have made them grow.

18) Nommo (the spoken word.)

It was the spoken word of the village elders

that made me finishes my schooling.

I do not know whether a) writing and b) radio, film, TV would be regarded

as additional senses. I have heard them spoken of as such on first

acquaintance, but not on familiarity. The problem of their being tied too

closely with non-Bantu cultural parameters arises.

19) Geographical.

This is a good place to plant tobacco, but not to live.

20) Atmospheric/Climatic.

The sky presses down on my head today.

The coming storm makes women contradict their husbands.

21) Geological.

The earth rumbles with laughter and tickles out feet.

The dead are angry and grumble under the ground.

22) Maritime (lunatic, maritic.)

Feel the sea through the boat.

The fish talk along the line about the cold depths of the sea, etc.

This list of senses is far from exhaustive. It is merely given as an indication. It does demonstrate why most Western educated anthropologists and administrators have made such a poor job of interpreting what they are. Seen through the narrow often one-way windows of the five Western senses, they have simplified Africa to fit in with their narrow interpretations. Social anthropology is starting to realize this limitation and is encouraging anthropologists to study their own cultures instead of trying to interpret so-called ‘primitive’ cultures.

APHORISMS.

a) General

1. The concept of BEING can only operate within a universal causality. The concept of FORCE can occur outside causality but causality provides a framework within which a hierarchy of forces is possible. The concept of PRESENCE requires only an anthropocentric base and common sense organs.

2. A rule of thumb test to distinguish between Existence (state of Being) and Presence is to ask the question:

“How do you know?”

“I just know.” Indicates existence

“I can feel (hear sense) it” Indicates presence.

b) Ntu

3. For Temples, Kagame and Jahn, the NTU is a non-quantifiable force or energy. Thus to speak of portions as does Jahn, to divide it into categories without an outside criterion as does Kagame, or to speak of an hierarchy as does Tempels, is nonsensical. Such divisions or construction as these processes require would have to have a quantitative basis.

c) Nommo

4. The Greek LOGOS represents a logical framework with which man seeks to superimpose order on a probably a-logical universe.

The Bantu NOMMO represents a rhythmic framework within which man seeks to superimpose order on a probably rhythmical universe.

5. The spoken word in an oral culture naturally plays a more important role than it does in a written culture. Writing has never been used on any significant scale by local populations South of the Sahara. There has been ample opportunity and no lack of cultural exchange across the Sahara since the early Egyptian times. Yet writing in Africa has remained the property of the colonials and of a small percentage of evolutes. It would seem that the entire social structure and even cosmic arrangement in Africa is based on the spoken word.

The use of writing by the enslaving and colonial cultures of Islam and Christianity has given writing an understandably bad name.

6.NOMMO includes myth, legend, song, story, everyday speech, drum language, rhythm, etc. It may be said to represent Africa’s searching’s for the rhythmic interrelations of all the known auditory components of the universe.

7.What distinguishes muntu presences from kintu presences is NOMMO> Thus an animal that can talk is not a talking animal (kintu), but a human (muntu) who has assumed external or apparent animal (kintu) form.

d) Symbols

8.If sense data are primary symbols, we can have a fuller symbolism by relying on a wider range of senses.

9.The magical symbol, medicine or ritual has the same significance for the Bantu as the crucifix; bread and wine have for a devout Catholic. The difference is that the Bantu draws no distinction between ‘everyday’ and ‘spiritual’ life. For him all life is spiritual in the most important sense of the word. This has enabled him to retain his sense of wonder.

e) Senses

10. Western philosophy is concerned with the HOW of perception. Bantu philosophy is concerned with the WHAT of perception. As a result, in Bantu philosophy the sharp distinction between dream and reality blurs as both give us similar information.

11. All Western scientific knowledge is dependent on the sense of sight and its four acolytic co-relations, giving the scientist the “observable”, the window through which he interprets and classifies his knowledge.

12. All knowledge not derived from the five senses is – by Western thinking – ‘either derived from some grab-bag ‘sixth’ sense or it is dismissed as mysticism.

13. The sense of sight’s primacy in the field of the Western five senses is greatly assisted by the eyes’ physiological primacy as the ‘buds of the brain’

14. For the phenomenologist existence precedes essence. In traditional Western theories of perception essence precedes existence.

In Bantu philosophy essence and existence coalesce in the anthropocentric presence. There is no need for theories of perception.

15. The idealist assumption is that there is a one-to-one relation between sensations and objects. In Bantu philosophy there is the realization that both sensations and objects are both primary and subjective processes (experiences) which, through recurrence and agreement, acquire a certain degree of objectivity (acceptable inter-subjectivity).

16. To call Bantu perception empiricism is to misunderstand that the ‘object-out-there’ has no assumed ontological standing or existence. It only makes sense to speak of PRESENCE which is perceived through qualitative sensation.

17. Each sense has it ethical parameters and moral prerogatives.

18. Enlargement of the sensory ‘window’ (door of perception) in Western thinking by such means as a ‘sixth sense’, parapsychology, astro-archeology, etc. seldom brings with it an enlargement of moral sensibility and responsibility. Very often (e.g. Madame Blavatsky and Alistair Crowley) it is thought to lift the possessor of such extra sense above the level of morality into some superior amoral sphere.

19. Self-awareness as an objective process has no place in Bantu philosophy. One is more aware of one’s own presence that one is of other presences through the kinetic and hormonal senses (for instance); but there remains the overall awareness that one is dependent on other people for the general picture of one’s own presence. We see ourselves in the mirrors of other peoples’ sensitivities. Introspection plays no role in the life of Africa and brooding on one’s own is taken as an indication of mental disturbance.

20. Some senses may start out individually and become participatory and communal as recognition brings in more presences who add to the overall presence. Thus in love-making, the hormonal sense becomes communal to the two participants. In a spring festival it may become communal to all the participants giving what non-participating missionaries have described as an orgy. In the rituals of some societies, some of the individual senses are said to become communal as a matter of course at the apex of the ritual. This is claimed of Vaudau (voodoo), Mau-Mau oath-taking and similar ‘secret society’ reactions to colonial suppression. They may be seen as attempts to coalesce the presences into a unity capable of opposing destructive forces ranged against the society by slavery and colonialism.

21. If we deny our internal senses we are apt to think their rumblings the strange but unspecified voices of that quasi-religious construct we call SOUL.

22. The pleasure/pain distinction is a refinement; on analysis and definition of sensory experiences (esp. tactile) after the event. It starts to imply social awareness.

23. The kinetic sense is explicable only by description and demonstration.

Linguistic Analysis

Linguistic Analysis has its uses in Western philosophy where the cultural milieu of writing has managed to give words a much more fixed meaning and usage than in an oral culture. The change from an oral to a written culture (and vice versa) is a slow and ongoing process and one must not make the error of assuming that because a member of a written culture cannot read or write, that he will use language in the same way as a member of an oral culture (or vice versa_.

Thus the gradual deliteration of the Cape Dutch society as it became the trek-boer, Voortrekker, Republican and finally ‘poor white’ was a process that took place over more than 250 years. It in no way enhanced understanding between its members and the oral culture tribes with which they had contact.

An English medium public school education for Albert Luthuli did not make him a ‘black Englishman’. It is a measure of the man’s’ greatness that it did equip him to make some pertinent comparisons between Zulu and Natal English cultural milieu’s.

Kagame’s linguistic analysis is a useful study in that it reveals the stem NTU which underlies the notions much as Bantu, kintu, hantu, etc. But very little linguistic analysis is required to do this; a careful study of a language on a less analytic plane would have given the same result.

One can do a similar study of the Zulu language as follows:

ONA kala Badness

ONA Damage

ukw ONA kala Break down, dismantle

ba ONA yo Destructive

ukw ONA Detriment, transgression

t ONA Flatter

z ONA Hate

From this one could derive the root ONA which, when used as a root signifies the presence of a destroying or damaging agent. This would correspond to Tempels’ destroyer ‘muloji’ which he claims to be responsible for ‘conscious crimes of destruction’, the degrading of the muntu. One might then go on to posit this ONA as a malevolent force, opposed to the NTU yet remaining essentially subservient to it in the ‘balance of nature’. One could draw parallels between the Zulu world view and that of Christianity with Ntu and the Holy Ghost and ONA and Satan as notions that are essentially interchangeable. This theory could then be given empirical weight by showing the importance which the Holy Ghost holds in the ceremonies of Zulu separatist churches.

Unfortunately there seems to be no African notion (certainly no Zulu one) which parallels the Christian notion of Satan as this stem ONA would seem to suggest. If there was such a ‘bad’ force, one would expect the Christian notion to become creolized with the notion of ONA in the separatist churches. This has, to an extent, happened with the notion of the Holy Ghost (the Holy Ghosts of ancestors are identified with the Catholic saints in the West Indies. In the Zulu Zionist churches the communal effect of the tribal ancestors and the prophets is spoken of as the Holy Spirit). It has not happened to Satan and even after more than 150 years of Christian contact, the Zulu still creolized and speak of ‘u Satane’ or ‘I Demoni’. Their attitude towards him is that of a fractious child – not to be taken too seriously.

This would seem to indicate that the Zulu people do not conceive of a bad force in antithesis to a good one. The good force/bad force antithesis smacks more of a Western missionary imposition.

If we cannot assume the notion of ONA, a destroying force, from a cursory study of the Zulu language; can we justifiably assume the notion of NTU from Kagame’s linguistic analysis? I think not and have merely assumed – in spite of collaboration from other authors such as Jahn and Tempels – that Kagame is using Ntu as a bridge notion to lead Western minds away from the static/harmonious Greek concepts surrounding Being to a more qualitative and dynamic world view.

Just as Western philosophy has often become thinking about thinking with its often fruitless degree of abstraction, so linguistic analysis has often become talking about language instead of using language as a limited but essential means of communication.

APPLICATION

In the following section I wish to give a few examples of problem areas; spheres of misunderstanding between the West and Africa. In these examples I try to indicate how the application of Bantu philosophical insights can lead to better understanding.

1. Mental illness and suicide

A creative role in a network of interpersonal relationships gives a large measure of psychological security. In close-knit tribal life it tends to be inclusive of a fairly limited number of people but does make for a low incidence of mental disturbance.

Most mental illness has a social basis and as African society tends to be closely integrated; its incidence is lower and its cure communal and inclusive rather than individual and exclusive.

The only common indication of mental aberration I have found in African societies is a confusion of qualities and their attribution to presences with which those qualities are not usually associated. e.g.:

Bemba He hears stones speak

M’Pondo She mated with a bull.

In urbanizing Africa the incidence of mental aberration is increasing but still remains spectacularly lower than for Westerners under similar socio-economic conditions. This could possibly be a result of the closeness of the extended family which survives (albeit it in a weakened form) the process of urbanization.

Similarly the incidence of suicide in tribal society is very low and only increases slightly with urbanization.

The world view of anthropocentricity and of the inter-relation of all presences seems to provide a framework of meaningfulness – which is always there as an aid even in the loneliness of mental illness or contemplated suicide. It helps cushion the complex stresses that face the process of black and all urbanization.

2. Love

In both the East and the West one finds a fair share of the prophets of love; prophets who preach love as some sort of mystical cement to fill the gaps in human relationships. Love is some kind of filler concept to give people hope when human relationships are not working.

In the Bantu anthropocentric world the concept of LOVE is unnecessary as the importance of interpersonal relationships need no abstract verbal or conceptual underlining.

In the West a bride will insist on knowing that her husband-to-be loves her.

In Africa a bride is satisfied in the knowledge that her husband is a good man. i.e. One who has found his niche in the network of interpersonal relationships.

3. Law

The existence of a recognized code of law which is interpreted by trained legal experts is based on the assumption that there is a universal and determinable world order. It also assumes that such a code of law is the nearest man – with his still limited understanding – can come to fitting in with that universal order. The assumed universal applicability of law and order means that individuals must be subservient to the law and one has such strange notions as “the majesty of the law”, “the justice of fate”, etc. arising. A code of law will tend to be normative.

The Bantu world-view, with its anthropocentric base, does not recognize such universality. It recognizes instead that laws are only necessary when human relations break down. An appeal to African law is an appeal to the norms of that society as established by past cases. Case study in African law becomes normative by trimming the edges of human relationships that do not work.

But there are also those laws laid down by social innovators. These are usually laws by edict and are innovative. Thus when Chaka and Dingane were forging a colonial power from a diversity of small, widely-dispersed tribes, they made a number of laws that were enforced by various punishments and social restrictions. However, most of these laws – with the exception of those that corresponded closely with the pre-dynastic norms – fell into disuse with the fall of the tyrant kings. (the end of their presence).

This kind of law is used to initiate social change and if the change is successful, it becomes acceptable as case law. If the change is not successful, the law falls into disuse.

4. Drums

Part of the colonial ravaging of Africa consisted of the suppression and near annihilation of the drum language. This suppression – efficient from the conqueror’s point of view as it eliminated long-range communication – has left a gap in African culture which writing cannot adequately fill.

The drum language, a phonetic short-hand used to communicate important news, operated as a sort of pahlevi. The phonetic sounds were pretty standard for wide geographical areas within which each language group translated the sounds into their own language. The drum language had other uses as well. It was used to evoke ritually the memories of the ancestors. It bolstered courage for the hunt or battle. It expressed a social solidarity wider than the tribe (the whole area covered by the pahlevi). It reinforced feelings of rhythm and unity between presences both human and other.

The rhythm of the interrelations of presences in the universe (which the Pythagoreans expressed in terms of mathematics) were expressed in the rhythm of the communal or contact senses in which the auditory rhythms of the drum were perhaps the most obvious.

Thus a Masai moran will not attack mating lions for fear that disturbing the rhythm of their love-making will bring bad luck (i.e. will disturb the wider rhythm of the cosmos). Forms of selective hunting and gathering such as seasonal taboos, fear of killing pregnant game, etc. are also explained in terms of drum rhythms.

Little did the European colonial – now pre-occupied with game conservation- know that in suppressing the drum language he also removed the king-pin of an effective and workable system of game-cropping.

5. Happiness

Without going to the single factor extreme of hedonism, one might say that the pursuit of happiness is a common human pursuit. Yet even in this common pursuit the West and Africa differ in important ways.

A Westerner will often tell (an audience is essential) of a time that he was truly happy. Such ‘happy’ times are usually experienced in isolation or in relation to things other than fellow human beings. Even when reflecting on a particularly close and rewarding human relationship, the tendency is to claim that “I was happy” rather than “We were happy”.

From this rather tentative evidence I would conclude that happiness for the West is individually based and a state of which one becomes aware only by retrospective introspection.

For the Bantu, MAGARA is a modality that belongs to the here and now and is essentially communal. An individual cannot be happy on his own and I have yet to hear a Bantu reflect on some past Golden Era. MAGARA is experienced communally. Their MAGARA and your own enables one’s fellow men to impinge more sharply on one’s senses. It is spoken of as the medicine that makes men grow (presences expanded).

6. Faith

Kant must get rid of the ontological proof of God in order to make room for faith. The phenomenologist has tried to superimpose a mystical aura into man’s ontological status in order to make room for faith (belief, compassion, empathy, etc.) in human relationships. In doing this he has made two errors:

a) He has left the static/harmonious ontological basis unquestioned.

b) He has ignored man’s tendency to make qualitative distinctions between his own ontological status and that of other men.

In Bantu philosophy knowledge is a coalition of belief and assumption. One believes in another presence in the same way one believes in an ancestor or the founding father of the tribe. Faith and presence are not mutually exclusive or contradictory concepts. One assumes beliefs similar to one’s own to be generally held by others.

7. Ancestor Worship

This is an aspect of Bantu philosophy which has been discussed by almost all Western authors of books on Africa. Their attitudes range from outright condemnation to a condescending tolerance for the ‘naïve primitivism’.

African authors have either ignored it or compared it with the peasant spiritualism or shamanistic roots of Western religions.

In trying to explain ancestor worship one comes up against the same difficulties as when trying to explain mysticism in the West. It is essentially a personal experience which does not even attempt to achieve an acceptable inter-subjectivity. The exclusiveness of the experience is an important part of it.

A Labula elder describes it this way; “When I do not know what to do, I ask,

‘How would my father and uncle have solved this riddle?’ My uncle taught me to hunt with a bow and arrow. When I see his mask in the family shrine, I remember the skills he taught me. When we are hungry for meat, I hunt as my elders taught me to. Their spirit helps me”.

From this and similar examples it is pretty clear that the ancestor figure, the bazimu mask, etc. are merely symbols in a similar way to which the crucifix is a symbol for Catholicism and not an object deified for its own sake. They are not pagan objects of veneration as the Islamic and Christian colonizers assumed. There is even recognition that words are also largely symbols, a realization often missing in Western thinking.

As one’s ancestors taught one most of the skills and gave one wisdom (handed down through the oral tradition) with which to cope with everyday crises and exigencies, they are most often appealed to. It is only in times of tribal calamity and severe threat to the social order that appeals to the tribal founder, the initiator or mythical creator of that order are naturally more appropriate. Such appeals are uncommon and for the most part the founding ancestor operates as a Deus-in-Absentia. Awareness of a threat to the social order requires a sensitivity often missing in the West.

I think it is a mistake to compare this founding father with the present-day Christian and Islamic conceptions of God and Allah as the Prime 
Cause, Omnipresent, Omniscient, All-Powerful, etc.

Bantu concepts of causality do not require a Prime Cause. Bantu societies make no assumption of being static and need no appeal to a higher power than man and his past experience to account for change. A dynamic balance is maintained by the muntu/presence’s realization of his interdependence with other presences and with his environment. It is only when either of these interdependencies is threatened, be it ‘natural’ disaster, conquest or civil war, that there is a felt need to appeal to the custodian of the social order. There is no custodian of the ‘natural’ order. The custodian of the social order might be the tribal ancestor who is primary in the anthropocentric universe; or it may be one of the numerous elements that are analogously referred to by the names of ancestors who had similar characteristics to such elements. Thus a noisy, voracious grandfather may be appealed to stop a locust plague, an uncle who drank heavily to stop a flood.

I think Mbiti’s analysis of African religions at fault insofar as he tries to make African religions respectable by showing that they have the elements of universality which both Islam and Christianity claim. I think this a misguided analysis as religious experiences are primarily individual and closely societal rather than universal.

The qualitative nature of NTU (PRESENCE) means that a man may – when his is acting forcefully and with majesty – have more presence than God. This possibility and the Deus-Inferius-in-Absentia it implies is unacceptable to Western trained missionaries like Tempels and Kagame and leads them to invent a quantifiable basis for God.

In tribes which live under difficult environmental conditions (e.g. Dinks) the Deus-in-Absentia it implies is rather vague. This is as the quality of God (presence) is unpredictable in times of stress while the actions of men in times of natural disasters are robust and obvious. Individual and helpful men are thus more important that a vague and willful God.

8. Immortality

Immortality in the West is seen as the survival of the soul after physical death. There is wide divergence of opinion as to the nature of this soul, but there seems to be agreement on the assumptions that it is individual and that it is describable analogously only. There is also wide divergence of opinion on how, how long and where this soul survives.

For the Bantu immortality is far less vague and has a clear anthropocentric base. A presence survives physical death by remaining a presence in the memories of the living. Thus my friend Damine remains alive as long as I use and practice the skills of archery he taught me. When I teach these skills to others, acknowledging their source, Damine lives on in that generation and so forth until memory fades. Immortality thus depends on one’s positive achievements and offspring become very important as they will naturally be the best carriers of one’s immortality. A man is dead in a more complete sense if he is dead without offspring than he would be with many offspring. This is an attitude not considered by the prophets of birth control

Similarly great social institutions and innovations will gain a longer immortality for the innovator as the changes he affected went further that his immediate family. Thus Dingane and Chaka remain immortal in the memories of the Zulu people as nation builders for as long as the Zulu nation survives in a recognizable form. Recognition of their tyrannies and malpractices in no way detracts from their presence as founding fathers. It may even add to it.

There is no conclusion to this thesis. Bantu philosophy is alive and well and is a long way from conclusion. But a cautionary note is necessary. Pointing out the differences between cultures, peoples or philosophies in no way implies that they must be treated differently, that any are superior or denies anyone basic human rights. I regard this as very important and think the infringement of human rights unjustifiable on any grounds.

The Western liberal attitude is that human rights are found on the assumption of the basic unity of men and human nature. This makes it easy to dismiss as one need only show one difference between two individual humans to make the assumption and thence the conclusion untenable.

I would attest that it is a measure of man’s greatness that he can – in spite of tremendous differences – commune with other men and can respect in them and in his behavior towards them, the same basic human rights he claims for himself.